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Abstract
For the ﬁrst time in U.S. history, the protection of books and other 
cultural resources became an ofﬁcial war aim during World War 
II. Examining the broad historical process by which this policy was 
formed and executed, this article focuses on three key factors: the 
new role of intellectual and cultural elites, who forged close ties with 
the state; the expansion of intelligence gathering and its unintended 
consequences for the preservation of cultural material; and the ex-
traordinary actions of individual librarians, curators, and ordinary 
soldiers on the ground, who improvised solutions to the problems 
of preservation and restoration.
In April 2003, as American combat operations in Iraq gave way to the 
early days of occupation, journalists reported widespread looting and dam-
age to Iraqi museums, libraries, and archives. At a news brieﬁng on April 
11, responding to questions about the failure to protect Iraq’s cultural 
heritage, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously replied: “Stuff 
happens!” Complaining about the recurring broadcast of “some boy walk-
ing out with a vase,” he observed, “it’s untidy, and freedom’s untidy, and 
free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad 
things.” He went on, “They’re also free to live their lives and do wonder-
ful things, and that’s what’s going to happen here” (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2003). The early reports indicated a catastrophic loss of art, ar-
chaeological artifacts, and rare manuscripts. Later investigations showed 
that Iraqi ofﬁcials had removed many treasures for safekeeping, and that 
some American military ofﬁcers had acted quickly to guard the National 
Museum and recover stolen objects (University of Pennsylvania Museum, 
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n.d.; Bogdanos, 2005; Johnson, 2005). Still, the destruction and disorder 
underscored the limited forethought given to protecting such resources. 
Freedom and fatalism seemed to go hand in hand.
Such planning was hardly outside the realm of possibility or imagina-
tion. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a directive of December 29, 1943, 
during the Allied invasion of Italy, addressed the protection of “cultural 
monuments,” by which he meant not only historical buildings and churches 
but also portable forms of culture, such as books and art. His words are 
worth quoting at length:
Today we are ﬁghting in a country which has contributed a great deal to 
our cultural inheritance, a country rich in monuments which by their 
creation helped and now in their old age illustrate the growth of the 
civilization which is ours. We are bound to respect those monuments 
so far as war allows. . . . Nothing can stand against the argument of 
military necessity. That is an accepted principle. But the phrase “mili-
tary necessity” is sometimes used where it would be more truthful to 
speak of military convenience or even of personal convenience. I do 
not want it to cloak slackness or indifference.1
The difference is striking across sixty years—-in the message, tone, and 
assumptions of wartime leaders, and in the policies and procedures they 
oversaw. There are several immediate reasons one could give for the dis-
parity between 1943 and 2003. The most obvious is that Americans esteem 
European civilization as their cultural inheritance and, perhaps, as a source 
of cultural superiority; Islamic tradition and Arabic culture do not have 
such resonance. This may well be true, but it hardly explains why the gov-
ernment instituted a program of cultural protection during World War 
II and but apparently did little in the run-up to the Iraq war. Americans’ 
Eurocentrism did not lead inevitably to Eisenhower’s directive, nor were 
present-day policymakers and the military unaware that cultural sensitivity 
was necessary in Iraq.
Why, then, was cultural protection a war aim in World War II? How was 
a policy effected, and to what extent did it address the speciﬁc question 
of endangered books and libraries among other treasures? How might we 
comprehend these efforts—-and their limits—-in the social, cultural, and 
political currents of the 1940s? Are there insights from the World War II 
experience that might help us better address the challenges to books and 
other cultural resources in current times of crisis and war?
At the outbreak of World War II, leaders of learned societies, philanthropic 
foundations, research libraries, museums, and professional associations 
began to anticipate the impact of war on cultural resources. The Library 
of Congress, the New York Public Library, and other institutions put in 
motion plans to safeguard their most treasured documents and books. 
The leadership of the American Library Association (ALA), with its strong 
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internationalist bent, saw a prominent role for libraries on the home front. 
Indeed, when the United States entered the war, many libraries offered 
public programs, mounted exhibits, and created information centers on 
a host of issues, from defense jobs to rationing. Librarians joined those 
who mobilized the world of learning and culture for the national defense 
(Becker, 2005; Kraske, 1985; Lincove, 1991).
At this time, a small number of individuals turned their attention to the 
looming devastation of European culture, with the hope of ﬁnding ways 
to safeguard it. These were, by and large, men of the nation’s intellectual 
and cultural elites. After the fall of France in June 1940, Harvard faculty 
formed the American Defense–Harvard Group to combat isolationism and 
provide intellectual backing and expertise for the war effort. Paul J. Sachs 
and George L. Stout of the Fogg Museum of Art, spurred by reports from 
abroad, worked with the leadership of the Metropolitan Museum and the 
National Gallery of Art to push for a federal commitment to protect cultural 
resources. David Finley, director of the National Gallery, used his political 
connections in the War Department, the Ofﬁce of Strategic Services, and 
most crucially with Supreme Court Chief Justice Harlan Stone to approach 
President Franklin Roosevelt with a plan to safeguard cultural sites in war 
areas. The American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) had begun its 
own discussions and established a Committee for the Protection of Euro-
pean Cultural Material in January 1943; led by William Bell Dinsmoor, di-
rector of the Archaeological Institute of America, its membership included 
Archibald MacLeish, then Librarian of Congress, and Solon Buck, archivist 
of the United States. It too lobbied for a commission.2
Roosevelt approved the plan, and in June 1943 the American Commis-
sion for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in 
War Areas, chaired by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, began its work. 
Cooperating with the Harvard Group and ACLS, the Roberts Commission 
provided maps and lists of cultural sites to the military and identiﬁed army 
personnel qualiﬁed to safeguard cultural resources in the ﬁeld of battle. 
Although it included the Far East in its mission—-including “war areas” in 
its title—-it remained focused on the threat to European civilization. The 
ﬁrst Monuments Ofﬁcer, Harvard classicist Mason Hammond, was sent to 
North Africa in 1943 and then accompanied the troops into Italy. The Allied 
command created a unit called the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives 
section (MFAA), whose small band of ofﬁcers tried to cordon off historic 
buildings, minimize looting, and give ﬁrst aid to art and books; when the 
war ended, the MFAA turned its attention to the recovery and restitution 
of cultural objects.
This was a remarkable decision: the ﬁrst time the American government 
had established the cultural protection of art, books, and historic buildings 
as a war aim. The importance of cultural property had begun to be recog-
nized in international law since the late nineteenth century, but vaguely 
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stated principles had produced few concrete results, even in World War I. By 
the early 1940s, a convergence of events, memories, ideology, and individuals 
led cultural leaders to transform their mounting alarm into action.
New methods of organized violence—-from the aerial bombing in World 
War I and the Spanish civil war to the Nazis’ systematic attacks on property 
and persons—-had intensiﬁed awareness of the vulnerability of artistic and 
intellectual resources. The destruction of books in particular loomed large 
in the collective memory of intellectuals and cultural elites of the time. The 
ruin of the University of Leuven’s library, as German soldiers stood by and 
watched the ﬂames, was one of the shocking moments of World War I; it 
conveyed modern warfare’s threat to civilization (Graves, 1929).3 The Nazi 
book burnings of 1933 similarly opened a window onto the violent tactics 
and fascist ideology of Hitler’s new regime. Many people would come to see 
“libricide,” as Rebecca Knuth (2003) terms it, as a crime against humanity. 
Not everyone took the measure of this event at the time—-Patti Clayton 
Becker (2005, p. 22) notes that the library journals did not comment on 
it—-but inﬂuential intellectuals and politicians condemned the Nazis’ ac-
tions and thousands marched in protest in American cities (Kantorowitz, 
1944; Stern, 1985). 4
Information about the fate of cultural institutions trickled out of Eu-
rope in the earliest years of the war in personal correspondence, through 
encounters with refugees, and from statements by governments in exile. 
Some events, such as the second destruction of the Leuven library and 
the bombing of Coventry Cathedral, received coverage in newspapers and 
on radio. But much of the available information circulated only among 
professionals in cultural ﬁelds. During the Blitz, British librarians and mu-
seum staff wrote their American friends and colleagues, assessing damage 
to their collections and suggesting air raid precautions; their letters were 
often reprinted in professional journals. Although many valued works of 
art, manuscripts, and rare books had been sent to safe havens away from 
the urban centers, incendiary bombs destroyed large portions of the li-
braries at the University of London, King’s College, and the Guildhall. 
“To a book-lover, it is heart breaking to see so many books in such a sorry 
plight, soaked with water or charred by ﬁre,” commented the librarian at 
Richmond.5 By 1942 and 1943, Germany’s systematic looting of occupied 
countries, including the plundering and forced sale of art collections in 
Belgium and France and the wholesale destruction of culture and learning 
in Poland, became more widely known.6
During the interwar years, the sense of culture’s fragility had been coun-
tered in various ways by civic, professional, and voluntary organizations. 
The campaign to rebuild the Leuven library, for example, involved the 
Carnegie Endowment, Herbert Hoover’s Commission for Relief in Bel-
gium, and countless college students, alumni, and schoolchildren. The 
library profession had taken on a number of international commitments 
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during and after World War I, for example, the Library War Service and 
the American Library in Paris; the international orientation of the ALA 
leadership—-despite the apathy or opposition of many rank-and-ﬁle librar-
ians—-began in this period. The robust response of men at leading universi-
ties, learned societies, research libraries, and museums during World War 
II thus built on a history of private initiatives. They knew and worked with 
each other and possessed the conﬁdence and authority that elite status 
and expert knowledge often produces. This must have been true of earlier 
generations of cultural leaders. What was different in these years was their 
growing intimacy with the state.
The New Deal established important precedents for a governmental 
policy toward endangered cultural heritage. In the 1930s the federal gov-
ernment had deﬁned a state interest in cultural matters, through such 
domestic programs as the Federal Arts Project and the Historical Records 
Survey, and in initiatives in public diplomacy, notably the Division of Cul-
tural Relations in the State Department. New national cultural institutions 
emerged, such as the National Archives and the National Gallery, founded 
in 1934 and 1937 respectively.
The individuals who lobbied to protect cultural monuments in wartime 
were not necessarily New Dealers. Rather, they had made close personal con-
nections with key members of the government—-on the Supreme Court, in 
the State Department, among Roosevelt’s set of advisers, and with Roosevelt 
himself. David Finley, for example, had hitched his star to Andrew Mellon, 
Secretary of the Treasury under Calvin Coolidge; Mellon created the Na-
tional Gallery of Art before he died, and Finley became its founding director 
in 1938 and a key ﬁgure in Washington. Archibald MacLeish likewise moved 
effortlessly between the worlds of culture and politics. A poet, playwright, 
and writer associated with the left, MacLeish became a member of the 
Roosevelt administration, serving as a speechwriter, Librarian of Congress, 
head of the Ofﬁce of Facts and Figures, and later as an ofﬁcial in the Ofﬁce 
of War Information and the State Department. Both Finley and MacLeish 
used their connections to promote cultural policy in wartime.7
In turn, government ofﬁcials and military leaders embraced the pro-
posal to protect art, libraries, and cultural sites for both pragmatic and 
idealistic reasons. The decision came as they planned the invasion of Italy. 
Ofﬁcials in the Civil Affairs Division and the Schools of Military Govern-
ment, making preparations for occupation governments, were especially 
receptive. Although concerned foremost with feeding, housing, and provid-
ing security to local populations, they also addressed the need to restore 
such social institutions as libraries, schools, and museums.
During the early stages of combat in Italy, civilian and military lead-
ers saw that culture would become a battleground in the war for public 
opinion—-in the United States and in Europe. Bombing transportation, 
communication, and production targets inevitably threatened churches and 
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historic buildings that dotted the Italian landscape. The Vatican repeatedly 
pressured the Allies to protect these sites, and Roosevelt’s advisors were 
fearful of offending the sensitivities of Catholic voters, including many of 
Italian descent. But the military responded not merely to a voting bloc but 
to a broader, if diffuse, public that found meaning in the world of books, art, 
and culture. As New York Times columnist Anne O’Hare McCormick wrote, 
“A great many oddly assorted Americans are deeply stirred and worried 
by the fate that hangs over Rome” (1943). As might be expected, she had 
heard from a classics scholar and a Catholic bishop, but less predictably 
from “a soldier in a Midwest training camp, from a woman worker in a 
Jersey munitions plant, from teachers and businessmen.” She concluded, 
“There can be no doubt that the American people’s conception of victory 
is to save everything in Europe that we can.”
Historians tend to ignore this constituency for high culture when they 
characterize the 1920s and 1930s as the era of motion pictures and radio. 
Librarians, along with educators and many commentators, certainly la-
mented the apparent triumph of mass culture and low-brow taste over the 
culture of arts and letters. But high schools, public libraries, and “middle-
brow” book clubs all made versions of European art, music, and literature 
widely available, and they spread the idea that European cultural heritage 
was an important component of American national identity. Even radio 
attracted listeners who preferred Toscanini to soap operas; although only 
a small part of a day’s entertainment, performances of classical music and 
informative shows about books and culture were regularly broadcast in the 
1930s.8 Whatever the extent of such cultural tastes, the wartime American 
government and military believed in the existence of such a constituency, 
and some counted themselves a part of it.
After Pearl Harbor, this sense of the value of European culture inevitably 
became politicized, fodder in ideological warfare. Fascist radio broadcasts 
maligned Americans as uncivilized vandals who would loot Europe, “ma-
terialists without intelligence and civilization,” “gangsters” who bombed 
religious and cultural sites “out of a sheer and senseless lust for destruc-
tion.” In their view, the United States had no true culture of its own. As one 
fascist newspaper in Milan observed, “Their art treasures are the longest 
and most ugly bridge in the world, the highest and most ugly building in 
the world and the largest and most ugly statue in the world.”9
Perhaps Americans saw a hint of truth in these charges, as the military 
went out of its way to disprove them. In step with Eisenhower’s 1943 di-
rective, they always underscored the primacy of saving soldiers’ lives but 
repeatedly asserted that, with precision bombing and military discipline, the 
cultural heritage of Europe could be saved as well. Journalists were invited 
aboard the planes that bombed Rome to witness how the Air Force carefully 
protected sacred sites, and newspapers regularly ran aerial photographs to 
show that no damage had occurred (Matthews, 1943; Dasenbrock, 2005). 
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Government ofﬁcials and editorialists forged an explicit connection be-
tween European cultural heritage and American ideals of democracy and 
freedom. “A history of civilization and liberty is written in the artistic and 
historic monuments of Europe,” noted the Roberts Commission. But this 
history required a fabricated European past in which castles and cathedrals 
symbolized the Four Freedoms. One of the more tortured expressions of 
this view appeared in a letter to the New York Times praising the Acropolis 
and other treasured buildings of Athens as “government-made work . . . 
the result of an ancient New Deal,” thus sanitizing Greek slave labor into 
a Works Progress Administration program.10
If individual works of art testiﬁed to the unique contributions of Eu-
rope, attention to the fate of books and libraries tied the New World to the 
Old in a different way: the printed word available to all, a cornerstone of 
American ideals. Thus the war brought about the increasingly political, even 
transcendent ﬁgure of the librarian as a front-line defender of freedom. 
Archibald MacLeish probably did more than anyone to produce this im-
age. Even before Pearl Harbor, he had called on librarians to declare war 
against fascism. Describing the librarian’s profession in 1940, he wrote: “In 
such a time as ours, when wars are made against the spirit and its works, the 
keeping of these records is itself a kind of warfare. The keepers, whether 
they so wish or not, cannot be neutral”11
These words resonate powerfully across the decades. But they raise the 
question, did MacLeish’s call to arms inﬂuence the making of a policy to-
ward cultural protection in wartime? The place of librarians and archivists 
in this effort was, in fact, a vexed one. The mandate of the Roberts Commis-
sion and the military’s Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives unit included 
the protection of books and archives, but it did so more as an afterthought 
than as a primary mission. At the meetings of the Roberts Commission, 
only MacLeish spoke about the needs of libraries; he did so repeatedly, yet 
the minutes show that few of his colleagues responded substantively to his 
concerns and suggestions. In late July 1944—-as the military grew more 
conﬁdent that victory was in sight—-MacLeish observed that there were 
no archivists and only one librarian doing cultural work in the European 
and Mediterranean theaters of war. Nor was there an effort to locate looted 
library collections. “There is nothing in the ﬁeld of books that corresponds 
to the work in the ﬁeld of art,” he complained.12 By the end of the war, the 
number of librarians and archivists in the European theaters had increased, 
but they continued to feel sidelined. Sargent Child, who had been sent from 
the National Archives to Germany to organize the collecting and restitution 
of archives, repeatedly griped about the dominance of the “art boys.” As 
he put it to his contact at the Library of Congress, “God damn these little 
art empire builders.”13
To be sure, the American policy toward cultural resources did protect 
a number of libraries and historic buildings holding private book collec-
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tions. The MFAA ofﬁcers in the ﬁeld found frequent instances of looting, 
mayhem, and the thoughtless use of books and manuscripts. Local residents 
and Allied forces burned books and bookshelves for warmth in unheated 
buildings and placed manuscripts on hard ﬂoors for makeshift mattresses. 
In one case, a Monuments ofﬁcer discovered a shopkeeper using eigh-
teenth-century manuscripts for wrapping paper. The breakdown of troop 
discipline was especially apparent in Naples, where a special commission 
investigated damage to prominent buildings and educational institutions. 
It found that “Allied troops broke into the National Library on more than 
one occasion, and in addition to ransacking ofﬁces and leaving them in a 
state of great disorder, forced open a safe from which they removed seven 
19th century gold medals.” Books had been strewn on the ﬂoors, laboratory 
equipment smashed, and animal specimens destroyed. MFAA ofﬁcers tried 
to prevent troop billeting in such places and argued for posting guards and 
“off limits” signs; they also sought to educate ofﬁcers and troops about the 
value of European culture.14
However noteworthy the Roberts Commission and the MFAA, their 
actions must be weighed in relation to other wartime activities. In a classic 
case of unintended consequences, the government’s need for intelligence 
had a greater impact on the fate of books than did the organizations whose 
mandate was cultural protection. The war brought librarians squarely into 
a relationship with the intelligence-gathering arm of the state through the 
Ofﬁce of Strategic Services (OSS), as well as the intelligence units of the 
armed forces. Created out of whole cloth, the OSS remains famous for its 
unorthodox methods and talent. Although its alumni ran the gamut from 
Herbert Marcuse to Julia Child, the OSS usually recruited experts from 
Ivy League institutions and top-ranked research universities. Despite its 
reputation for glamorous exploits, much of its work, perhaps a majority of 
it, involved prosaic tasks of gathering and analyzing published materials. 
Its founder, William “Wild Bill” Donovan, believed that intelligence could 
be learned from open sources, and he sought broad-based, contextualizing 
information about, for example, industrial production, transportation pat-
terns, and the psychology of the enemy.
Toward this end, the OSS set up an interagency group called the In-
terdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications 
(IDC) and recruited librarians, scholars, and others with linguistic ability 
and international experience to staff it. These included Frederick Kilgour 
and David Clift, who would become leaders in the library ﬁeld after the 
war; John K. Fairbank, the noted China scholar; and Adele Kibre, a lin-
guist, classicist, and experienced microphotographer before the war. The 
IDC established outposts in neutral cities—-Lisbon, Stockholm, New Delhi, 
Cairo, and Chongqing among them—-where agents could collect enemy 
newspapers, periodicals, and technical publications. Although they sent 
numerous originals back to the United States, the operation depended on 
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microﬁlm, which greatly reduced the weight and volume of materials for 
transport. Publications were microﬁlmed on the spot and sent to Washing-
ton and London for processing and distribution.15
Microﬁlm had emerged as a modern means of preservation and access by 
the 1930s, touted especially by the documentation movement. The war put 
this technology to the test. From a trickle in 1941—-Donovan was thrilled 
when the ﬁrst feet of microﬁlm arrived—-microﬁlm reels soon ﬂooded of-
ﬁcial Washington. In an eight-month period from November 1942 to June 
1943, the IDC microﬁlmed nearly 82,000 published items and collected 
over 23,000 original publications; in the same period, it distributed nearly 
three-quarters of a million items to a variety of war agencies.16
This massive microﬁlming effort itself preserved many publications 
that would otherwise have disappeared from the human record, includ-
ing obscure journals with small print runs, underground newspapers, and 
resistance pamphlets. Indeed, the Library of Congress had hoped that the 
IDC would generally acquire publications in the humanities and sciences 
for its collections at a time when the European book trade was disabled 
and the fate of book stocks unknown. Early on, it had struggled with the 
OSS for control of the IDC, contending, in essence, that the IDC’s most 
important purpose was to ensure the continuity of recorded knowledge. 
The OSS won that battle, arguing that, for the duration, acquisitions must 
be instrumental, a means to victory in the war. Although it had not bent 
the IDC’s mission to its desires, the Library of Congress remained one of 
the chief recipients of original and microﬁlmed publications from Europe 
and Asia during the war.
Attached to the OSS, the librarians began to transform themselves, as 
Frederick Kilgour put it, “from an acquisition group to an active producer 
of intelligence.”17 This came about partly out of necessity. The microﬁlm 
bounty quickly proved a curse, as complaints poured into the OSS. Not 
only were copies indecipherable, but the compilation of materials seemed 
to have no rhyme or reason—-an Italian newspaper, German technical 
manual, and French telephone directory might appear in quick succession. 
Over time, the librarians in the IDC’s Washington headquarters solved 
these problems by understanding their product more as information than 
as material texts. They created specialized subject classiﬁcations, indices 
to the microﬁlms, cross-reference cards, biweekly reports on new acquisi-
tions, and abstracts of articles, and they even offered full-text translations 
to their government clients. The organization hired a legion of indexers 
and translators, many of them women and émigrés, to accomplish what 
computers do now.
In the ﬁeld, too, IDC agents pushed at the constraints of their job de-
scription. They began to supplement microﬁlmed publications with their 
own observations and reports on conversations and rumors. Some became 
downright skeptical of the value of what is now termed “open-source in-
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telligence,” arguing that publications had to be actively combined with 
agents’ assessments of people and events. “Much of this general plan for 
omnivorous and utopian book gathering . . . has no great bearing on the 
winning of the war,” ﬁeld representative George Kates wrote from China in 
1944. “Some of the most vital information that this organization can gather 
is not in printed form, nor does it seem likely that it will become so.”18
Whether or not Kates was right—-that the acquisition of publications 
made a limited contribution to the war effort—-it is fair to say that this 
activity had a notable impact on cultural preservation. As the war in Eu-
rope moved into its ﬁnal stages, the IDC became a smooth quasi-military 
operation. Its agents interrogated German prisoners-of-war in England 
about the location of library collections, archival records, and book stocks 
that had been moved and hidden. Working with military intelligence and 
regular soldiers in groups called “T-forces,” they followed the advancing 
Allied armies, combing through buildings, caves, and mines to cart out all 
forms of printed and archival material.19 This wholesale collecting effort 
had several purposes: to learn about the immediate military and political 
situation in Germany and Japan, to anticipate the intentions of the Soviet 
Union, to compile records for war crimes tribunals, to help establish the 
postwar occupation government in Germany, and to begin a process of 
de-Naziﬁcation by collecting and segregating Nazi publications.
Whatever the speciﬁc strategic intentions, the result was a considerable 
effort to preserve books and other cultural objects, one that simply had not 
been anticipated by civilian or military leaders. Despite their earlier plan-
ning, the T-forces, Monuments ofﬁcers, and OSS men were unprepared 
for what they saw and found. Even as they encountered unbelievable dev-
astation, they daily turned up treasure troves. Across the American zone 
of occupation in Germany, wrote one MFAA ofﬁcial in July 1945, “we now 
know of more than 800 mines, castles, country houses, churches, hospitals 
and other public buildings which contain works of art, archives and librar-
ies.”20 Ultimately, they would ﬁnd 1,400 repositories.
In a program of organized pillage, the Nazis had removed entire collec-
tions from Poland and other occupied countries and had seized a vast array 
of Judaica from Jewish homes, synagogues, and institutions for a planned 
“Museum of an Extinct Race.” German ofﬁcials had also belatedly moved 
their own book collections out of cities, where Allied bombing campaigns 
severely damaged library buildings and archives. These collections had 
been relocated to various salt mines and caves, where volumes were often 
piled up willy-nilly. The status of the Prussian State Library suggests the 
enormity of the problem. When the Americans arrived in Berlin in 1945, 
they found few books still in the library building. Most had been evacuated 
to over two dozen sites, many in what would become the Soviet zone of oc-
cupation, as well as in Poland. Of the one and a half million volumes sent 
to one town in the U.S. zone, about one in eight had been lost or damaged; 
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others were never recovered when the owners of the storage facilities had 
themselves become refugees and could not be located (Poste, 1958, pp. 
234, 257; Hill, 1946).
The MFAA repeatedly drew attention to the “tragic need for more per-
sonnel to cope with the staggering exigencies of the present situation.”21 
The immediate requirement was to protect these sites by shoring up roofs 
and walls, moving materials away from damp and mold, and posting guards 
and off-limit signs. Looting by soldiers, visiting ofﬁcials, and local residents 
was a particular concern. Looting could be systematic, but more often it 
occurred opportunistically and it was nearly impossible to control. The 
longer range goal, of course, was to ﬁgure out what to do with all the ob-
jects they had found.
The Allies discussed and agreed on some general principles about the 
disposition of cultural objects, but few decisions about policy and procedure 
were reached. Soviet and French claims for reparations muddied the issue 
of cultural restitution and no agreement was reached on a single policy 
covering the four zones of occupation. As Michael Kurtz (1985, 2006) and 
Leslie Poste (1958) have written, the American occupation government 
established its own policies toward looted and displaced cultural materi-
als, setting up collecting points in the American zone where books, art, 
and other items were gathered, cataloged, and repatriated. Despite urgent 
requests, however, the MFAA received little support for this effort; a small 
number of American personnel, along with local Germans cleared of a 
connection with the Nazi Party, were assigned to this enormous task.
The contradiction—-strong statements of American policies to pro-
tect and restore European cultural heritage but a limited commitment 
to implement those policies—-should not be surprising. This was a new 
and uncertain venture for the government, whose foremost concerns were 
winning the war, safeguarding American troops, and ensuring a strong 
position for the United States in the postwar world. An exclusive focus 
on political and military leaders, however, obscures the extent to which 
wartime policy toward culture was made “on the ground,” by librarians, 
archivists, art curators, and scholars, as well as army ofﬁcers and ordinary 
GIs. The chaos of a war-torn territory, its privations and illegibility, pro-
duced quick decisions and makeshift procedures. The policies themselves 
were ambiguous and left ample room for interpretation and enterprise. 
In caves, mines, and bombed-out buildings, these men found themselves 
improvising solutions to preserve and return the millions of books and 
objects they had discovered.
One of the more intriguing examples is Douwe Stuurman, who had 
been a Rhodes scholar and teacher at Santa Barbara College before he 
joined the army as an ordinary GI. On his own, he began retrieving Nazi 
books and pamphlets; future generations needed to know this history, he 
believed, and these publications would provide concrete proof. One day 
380 library trends/winter 2007
Stuurman showed his archive to Sargent Child, and the amazed Monuments 
ofﬁcer could not contain his excitement. Stuurman had “run from Vienna 
to Nürnberg like a brilliant open ﬁeld runner—-he has gained access to 
cellars, attics, storerooms—-thru [sic] the help of German and Austrian 
scholars—-and by playing no tricks with them so that they learned to trust 
him—-has come up with the beacon.” With an unofﬁcial nod from his 
major, who quietly loaned him trucks, shelving, and space in a warehouse, 
Stuurman had collected over 100,000 items documenting the rise and fall 
of Nazi Germany.22 The principled call to preserve and document was, for 
Stuurman, a necessary rejoinder to looting and indifference.
The MFAA curators, archivists, and librarians in charge of the collect-
ing points across the American zone showed similar initiative and sense 
of ethical purpose, although perhaps without Stuurman’s ﬂair. American 
civilian and military leaders had determined that the restitution of cultural 
property would be made to the nations from which it had been taken; 
each nation was then responsible for restoring works to private owners. 
They had not set up procedures for the collecting points, however, and 
simply ordered the MFAA personnel to develop them. Thus art historian 
Craig Hugh Smyth, put in charge of the Munich Central Collecting Point, 
quickly decided how to arrange the work process, creating, for example, 
separate “national rooms,” where representatives from formerly occupied 
countries could come and, with the help of an assigned curator, research 
the provenance of the cultural property there.23
This procedure seems to have worked relatively well for many art and 
book collections, but looted Judaica—-over 2.5 million books, in addition 
to art and sacred objects—-were stateless items and posed an especially 
difﬁcult problem. The occupation government established the Offenbach 
Archival Depot for these materials (Poste, 1958, pp. 333–95; Waite, 2002; 
U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, n.d. b). Led by Jewish-American librar-
ians and archivists, the staff had the anguishing task of searching for rightful 
owners and deciding what to do with books whose owners had been mur-
dered or could not be found. Many groups laid claims to these orphaned 
books, including the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; the YIVO Institute 
for Jewish Research, which had relocated from Vilna to New York in 1940; 
and the Commission on European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, whose 
research director was Hannah Arendt. The Polish government called for 
the repatriation of books stolen from Polish Jews, although most had been 
killed in the Holocaust; the Library of Congress wanted works whose own-
ers could not be identiﬁed.
The Americans who worked at Offenbach were always aware of what the 
volumes represented—-the displacement or death of millions of Jews—-
and they seem to have approached the task with a striking degree of rev-
erence and empathy. “I would come to a box of books which the sorters 
had brought together, like scattered sheep into one fold,” Captain Isaac 
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Bencowitz wrote of his experience. “I would ﬁnd myself straightening out 
these books and arranging them in the boxes with a personal sense of ten-
derness as if they had belonged to someone dear to me, someone recently 
deceased.” He observed, “How difﬁcult it is to look at the contents of the 
depot with the detachment of someone evaluating property or with the 
impersonal viewpoint of scholarly evaluation.”24
The experiences of Douwe Stuurman and Isaac Bencowitz offer evi-
dence that cultural policy during World War II, for all that it involved the 
gaining of national advantage and prestige, simultaneously had a moral 
dimension. Those who encountered looted books and art, bombed librar-
ies, and damaged churches felt gripped by the destruction they witnessed. 
Librarians, archivists, and curators may have come into the battleﬁeld with 
an allegiance to cultural preservation, but others in the government and 
military felt a similar sense of responsibility. As Major General John H. 
Hilldring pointedly observed to the Roberts Commission, “soldiers aren’t 
the vandalistic people that some folks think they are.”25 Certainly it was 
often difﬁcult, even impossible, to navigate the cultural terrain of war by an 
ethical compass; other considerations—-from those of policymakers, with 
their geopolitical strategizing, to such practices “on the ground” as looting 
and black marketeering—-often prevailed. But if culture is often a domain 
for the instrumental projection of power, it never is only that.
War necessarily entails traumatic loss, and in the case of World War II 
those losses were catastrophic. Governmental measures to protect cultural 
resources were limited and not always effective. Policymakers took these 
steps with an eye toward favorable public relations and the future interna-
tional standing of the United States. Their actions undoubtedly reﬂected 
a Eurocentric understanding of human civilization. Still, the decision to 
effect a policy for the preservation of culture was a highly signiﬁcant one. 
It had an impact in real terms, saving books, artworks, historic buildings, 
and other material objects that do, in fact, speak to the continuities of the 
past, to individual and communal efforts to create, to invent, and to un-
derstand. And in the longer term, these actions have helped to make the 
idea of cultural preservation and restitution a legitimate one as an aspect 
of human rights (Barkan, 2000).
What can we learn from the history of cultural policy in World War II? 
There may be no direct lessons, but there are several points worth mak-
ing. The 1930s and 1940s nurtured intellectuals and cultural leaders who 
believed in a relationship with government ofﬁcials, policymakers, and the 
military; they were able to draw on those ties when faced with the problem 
of preserving culture in wartime. For many reasons, this relationship frayed 
in the second half of the twentieth century. Reaching across the divide now 
seems impossible for both sides. Scholars, intellectuals, and cultural ﬁgures 
often prefer the purist’s position of outsider and critic to messy interactions 
with civilian and military leaders. As was true in World War II, however, 
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recent wars in Bosnia and Iraq have spurred extraordinary efforts by in-
dividuals—-in academia and the military—-to preserve cultural heritage, 
restore stolen goods, document cultural crimes, and bring perpetrators to 
justice (Bogdanos, 2005; Riedlmayer, 2005). Their actions should inspire 
a new level of communication and commitment between the worlds of 
culture and politics. It would certainly be better to choose engagement 
than to rely on the law of unintended consequences.
Archibald MacLeish wrote in 1940, “It is the essential character of our 
time that the triumph of the lie, the mutilation of culture, and the persecu-
tion of the Word no longer shocks us into anger.”26 As he knew, freedom 
and democracy were bound up in the protection of and access to books, art, 
and culture. His diagnosis and prescription—-a call to librarians, scholars, 
writers, and lovers of democratic culture to abandon neutrality and engage 
in its defense—-continue to provoke and challenge us today.
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